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Abstract 
This paper is intended as a companion to the paper ‘Existence of non-cooperative 
equilibria in social systems by Prakash and Sertel(l974b) appearing in this volume. It aims 
to perform two tasks: (1) to give the reader a glimpse at the literature relevant to the 
existence of equilibria in social systems as it has developed since the writing of the Prakash 
and Sertel (PS) paper; and (2) to provide a class of examples illustrating where the PS 
notions of a social system and the non-cooperative equilibrium of a social system 
generalize the well-known concepts of games, abstract economies and their associated 
equilibria, showing how the existence theory of PS even today bears economic results 
beyond where alternative theories are applicable. 
JEL classification: C62; D51; D62; 030 
Keywords: Equilibrium existence; Production economies; Externalities; Technological change; Sustain- 
able Walrasian equilibria 
1. Introduction 
The Prakash and Sertel(1974b) (henceforth PS) paper, ‘Existence of non-coop- 
erative equilibria in social systems’, which gave rise to the present paper, has 
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remained unpublished for over two decades, coming to the attention of very few 
theorists’ during this period. 
Its results in economic theory or game theory had actually formed the main 
motivation for a certain amount of “background” work by P&ash and Sertel 
(1971, 1974a) in topological semigroups in the early 1970s. In this work they had 
formulated their topological semivector spaces, developing a fixed point theory 
for these spaces, all with the direct aim of proving their equilibrium existence 
theorems (Sertel, 1971; Prakash, 197 1) relevant to generalized games and 
economies. In fact, the mathematical basis of the PS (1974b) paper, causing the 
present paper, can be found in Prakash and Sertel (1974a), followed by their 
embedding theory in Prakash and Sertel (1976). 
A canonical example of a topological semivector space is the collection 
.Y&?[L] of compact and convex non-empty subsets of a real topological vector 
space (tvs) L, where addition is A + B = ((a + b) 1 a E A, b E B) and scalar 
multiplication is again as one would expect: AA = {Au I a E A}( A, B E X@[ Ll, 
A E 3). Note that %‘&‘[L] is the typical space of “feasible regions” in optimiza- 
tion, games, pseudo-games, economies, etc. Observe that the inverse under + 
does not exist, e.g. for L = ‘8 and A = [O,l] (The identity element is IQ], where Q 
is the “origin” of L, and there is no B E _%?@[L] such that A + B = (0) or 
B + A = {O}.) Thus, we have not only a semigroup under + , but in fact a 
semivector space under + and scalar multiplication (as defined above). The 
topological semivector spaces developed in Prakash and Sertel (1974a) are ab- 
stracted from X&‘[ L], motivated by the importance of this space for economics 
and game theory. As to Prakash and Sertel (1976), it invents an inverse for each 
element of a “hyperspace” (collection of subsets) of a tvs, as exemplified by 
Z&‘[ L], and this in a way that jives with the algebra of the semivector space and 
the continuity of its operations, extending the topological semivector space 
Z&?[L] to a topological vector space. Indeed, Prakash and Sertel thus embed 
..Y@[ L] in a tvs i whenever L is a tvs, choosing i locally convex if L is so, etc. 
Prakash and Sertel’s (1974a) fixed point theory (FPT) of “locally convex” 
topological semivector spaces generalized the then known FPT in locally convex 
topological vector spaces (the FPT of Brouwer, 1912; Kakutani, 1941; Tychonoff, 
1935; Fan, 1952 and Glicksberg, 1952) and so they had a relatively easy time 
establishing the existence of equilibria in their (1974b) paper (PS). (This is 
something that could not have been done, one should emphasize, by use of the Fan 
and Glicksberg FPT, at least directly, without necessarily invoking both papers of 
Prakash and Sertel, 1974a, 1976.) In the equilibrium existence theory of PS, we 
’ Notably, Ichiishi (1983, p. 74) has remarked: 
“P&ash and Sertel (1974) generalized the abstract economy to the situation in which the utility and 
also the feasible set of a player depend not only on the others’ choices of strategy but also on the 
others’ feasible sttategy sets (e.g. on enemy’s capabilities). Their logic for the existence theorem goes 
deep (beyond fixed point theorems for topological vector spaces).” 
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have a very broad and free “endogeneity”, in that feasible regions and preferences 
as well as the behavior of agents, are endogenous, the adjustment process allowing 
just about everything to depend on everything else: agents’ preferences are about 
not only the joint behavior of all agents (the usual thing), but also the feasible 
regions of all agents; so, the best responses of agents depend on all the mentioned, 
witnessing a broad class of externalities in preferences. Furthermore, an agent’s 
preferences are about not just the “current” behavior of all agents, but also pairs 
of “last” and “current” such behaviors. So, multistage settings are abstractly 
included to this extent. On the other hand, the feasible regions of all agents depend 
through a “feasibility map” on the joint behavior of all agents and on themselves, 
in the sense that a “new” feasible region listing for all agents is a deformation of 
the “old” such listing as affected by the agents’ choice behavior, and the manner 
in which an individual agent’s feasible region is altered may depend, not only on 
the original feasible region of that agent, but on those of all other agents as well. 
Thus, we see a rather broad class of externalities in “production” (feasibility) 
incorporated. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the literature 
since 1974 on abstract economies, generalized games, economies and their equilib- 
ria. Section 3 provides a class of examples of production economies in which the 
PS approach as a distinct advantage in establishing the existence of equilibria. 
Section 4 discusses when the non-cooperative equilibria of these economies will 
also be sustainable Walrasian equilibria and where (e.g. in the presence of 
switching costs) they may fail the requisite material balances condition. Section 5 
ends the paper with some closing remarks. 
2. A review of the literature 
The construct of an abstract economy and its social equilibrium, introduced by 
the classical paper of Debreu (19521, differ from a normal form game and its 
Coumot-Nash equilibrium in that the feasible sets of the players in an abstract 
economy are allowed to depend on the actions of others. The social equilibrium, 
whose existence Debreu (1952) proves, involves a finite number of agents, each 
with a strategy space lying in 8”. This construct, besides being of interest in its 
own right for the purpose of modelling social and economic phenomena, has been 
a valuable tool in proving the existence of competitive quilibria of economies. 
The first demonstration of this is in the celebrated Arrow and Debreu (1954) 
paper. 
Several extensions of Debreu’s (1952) result have appeared in the literature. 
Mas-Cole11 (1974) demonstrated, with a novel method differing from that of 
Arrow and Debreu (1954). that the preferences of consumers need not be transitive 
or complete for the existence of a competitive quilibrium in finite economies. 
Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975), inspired by this work of Mas-Colell(1974), and 
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using Kakutani’s (1941) fixed point theorem, showed that the preferences of 
agents need not be transitive or complete for the existence of a social equilibrium 
in an abstract economy. Borglin and Keiding (1976), using an argument concem- 
ing the existence of maximal elements, slightly generalized the Shafer and 
Sonnenschein result by weakening their requirements on preferences a bit further, 
keeping, however, both the number of agents and the dimensionality of their 
strategy spaces finite. 
Another line of research aimed at relaxing the finiteness condition for the 
dimensionality of strategy spaces and the number of agents. Yannelis and Prab- 
hakar (1983), relying on a continuous selection theorem of Michael (19561, 
allowed the strategy sets of agents to lie in any metrizable, locally convex 
topological vector space, permitting the set of agents to be countably infinite. 
Toussaint (1984) proved an equilibrium existence theorem for an arbitrary set of 
agents with strategy sets lying in an arbirrury topological vector space. Toussaint’s 
method of proof, again (cf. Borglin and Keiding, 1976) based on the existence of 
maximal elements, used the Browder (1968) fixed point theorem. Khan (1985) 
surveyed much of this and related work. In all of the above, the maps determining 
feasible regions were assumed continuous. Tulcea (1988) dropped the lower 
semicontinuity assumption on these maps. Tarafdar (1991) provided a similar 
result for Hausdorff topological vector spaces and an arbitrary set of agents. After 
the important steps of Yannelis and Prabhakar (1983) and Toussaint (1984) in 
dropping the finiteness assumptions on the set of agents and the dimensionality of 
strategy spaces, researchers such as Tan and Yuan (1994) also made advances in 
relaxing certain restrictions on “better than” and “feasible set” correspondences. 
A third line of research modeled the set of agents as a measure space, defining 
abstract economies and their social equilibria accordingly. Khan and Vohra (1984) 
accomplished this for finite-dimensional strategy spaces, while Yamrelis (1987) as 
well as Kim et al. (1989) allowed strategy spaces to be infinite-dimensional. All 
three studies used the Fan (1952)-Glicksberg (1952) fixed point theorem. PS does 
not take the measure theoretic modeling approach. 
All these studies, with minor modifications, adhere to the construct of an 
abstract economy. In contrast, PS introduces a novel object of a social system. In 
addition to the dependence of utilities and strategy sets on the strategies chosen by 
all agents, a social system also allows for the dependence of utilities and strategy 
sets on the strategy sets of all agents. Moreover, a social system can incorporate 
phenomena such as addiction or stickiness in behavior (as, perhaps, due to 
switching costs). The potential applications of such a construct are numerous, as 
illustrated by the class of examples presented in the following section. Alternative 
results on abstract economies or generalized games seem to be less well-suited to 
be applied to such examples. 
PS also proves the existence of a non-cooperative equilibrium of such a social 
system. The existence theorem places no restrictions on the cardinality of the set 
of agents, and the strategy sets may lie in any locally convex Hausdoff topological 
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vector space (cf. Yannelis and Prabhakar, 1983, and Toussaint, 1984). The proof is 
based on one of the Prakash and Sertel(l974a) fixed point theorems in topological 
semivector spaces. 
Turning now specifically to the topic of competitive equilibrium, Arrow and 
Debreu (1954) used an abstract economy construct in proving their existence 
theorem for such equilibria. Thereafter, their method was frequently applied. 
Examples of its application in finite-dimensional and finite-agent settings can be 
found in Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975) and Shafer (1976). Toussaint (1984) on 
the other hand, gave an outstanding example, demonstrating how to use the Arrow 
and Debreu approach when commodity space is infinite dimensional. This paper 
also generalizes Bewley’s (1972) equilibrium existence result (see below) to the 
case where preferences need not be complete or transitive. 
Three other proof strategies in infinite-dimensional commodity spaces are 
worth mentioning. One approach is based on market equilibrium, or the so called 
Gale-Nikaido-Debreu lemma. Infinite-dimensional extensions of this lemma are 
provided by Florenzano (1983) and Yannelis (1985), and these are applied by 
Florenzano (1983) and Khan and Yannelis (1991b), respectively, in proving the 
existence of competitive equilibria. A second approach has its roots in a paper of 
Negishi (19601, where the existence of competitive equilibria is established by the 
use of results from welfare economics. Magi11 (1981) and Mas-Cole11 (1986) 
provided infinite-dimensional applications of this approach. A third approach is 
the, by now, classical one of Bewley (1972), in 2, commodity spaces, based on a 
limit argument that makes use of existence results in the finite-dimensional case. 
Khan (1984), Duffie (19861, Yannelis and Zame (1986) are prominent applications 
of this method.2 
Before passing on to the next section we want to draw attention to the PS, 
Lemma 7 (see also Sertel, 1971, Section 3.1.4 and Theorem 3.3.1) on the upper 
semicontinuity of optimization. This is a tidy generalization of a similar result 
often attributed to Berge (1959), a yet more specific form of which was shown by 
Debreu (1952, p. 889). The PS optimization lemma directly states that the set of 
optimal solutions according to a closed complete preorder on a compact space is 
upper semicontinuous in the feasible region on which the optimization takes place. 
Their proof of this result, whose typical economic application concerns the upper 
semicontinuity of demand, is quite compact. 
The next section presents a class of examples in a private ownership economy 
with finitely many agents and just two commodities. They display several sorts 
of technological externalities, and preference externalities. Consumers may ex- 
hibit addiction or flip-flop tastes, and firms may experience switching costs in 
’ Khan and Yannelis (1991a) provides a more complete list of references on the subject, together 
with a collection of some recent, as well as some older but previously unpublished, very noteworthy 
work. 
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production. The question is the existence of a sustainable Walrasian equilibrium, 
and to answer this question here, we need the results of PS. 
3. A class of examples 
As an economic application of the PS existence theorem for a non-cooperative 
equilibrium, in this section we will present a class of genuinely economic 
examples of social systems that satisfy the PS sufficient conditions and hence 
possess non-cooperative equilibria of economic interest. We will keep technicali- 
ties to a minimum, restricting attention to Euclidean space as our underlying tvs 
and, in fact, to a world of two commodities, for instance, but will try to 
incorporate in our described social systems a rich variety of interactive aspects, 
which are normally avoided as troublesome in equilibrium theory. 
To this end, we first recall some notation of PS, to which we will henceforth 
adhere. For any topological space Y, Zj Y ] will denote the space of the non-empty 
compact subsets of Y, and when Y lies in a real vector space, Z&Y I will denote 
the space of the compact and convex non-empty subsets of Y. 
It will be recalled that, using the terminology and notation of PS, the PS 
sufficient conditions for the existence of a non-cooperative equilibrium of a social 
system, 
s= (<Xa. K, d:a, 9),4}* 
are that 
(PSl) X, be (non-empty) compact and convex in a locally convex Hausdorff 
topological vector space. 
(PS2) S, c Z&‘[ X, ] be a closed and convex cover of X, when Z[ X, ] carries 
the finite topology. 3 
(PS3) s (I be closed as a subset of ( X X 27 X X, I’, as well as upper semiconvex 
on X,. 
(PS4) 6, : X X S + 2’67[9, I be upper semicontinuous. 
Throughout, we choose every X, # fl to be compact and convex in ?I? ‘, 
directly satisfying condition (PSl). Condition (PS3) will also be satisfied quite 
directly, for in each of our examples we will take each s u to be represented by a 
real-valued function, which we check to be continuous on X X 9 X X, as well as 
3 For the finite topology see Appendix A.l.l of PS, or directly see Michael (19.51). 
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quasi-concave on X,. For the rest, we will check (PS2) and (PS4) for each 
example as we proceed. 
The social systems in our examples will be allowed to exhibit several types of 
unusually interactive features. One of these will be in the form of technological 
externalities in the sense that technologies of firms will be allowed to be affected 
by each other and/or by productive activities, be these one’s own or others’. Next, 
the profit functions of producers will be allowed to suffer switching costs. 
Likewise, consumers will be allowed to have preferences dependent on past 
behavior - be this the consumer’s own or others’ - and even on the feasibility 
(budget set) available to the consumer himself, or on those available to others. 
Consider an economy consisting of a sequence of spot markets in each of 
which, myopically, the consumers are concerned only with maximizing current 
utility and the firms with maximizing current profit. 4 The question then is the 
existence of a sustainable competitive equilibrium for such an economy: does 
there exist a list of technologies, budget sets, prices, production and consumption 
plans that can stay at rest while firms maximize profits, consumers maximize 
utility and markets clear (in the sense that there is no excess demand)? In 
considering this, one can also allow for the usual kinds of consumption and 
production externalities, which can be easily handled in the abstract economy 
framework of Debreu (1952). Among the extensions of Debreu’s existence 
theorem discussed in the previous section, however, there is no work, to our 
knowledge, whose construct of an abstract economy is rich enough to allow for the 
presence of the unusual features mentioned above and to be exemplified below. 
To avoid introducing new terminology, we present our examples in the 
language of a social system, resorting also to Arrow and Debreu (1952)‘s 
“auctioneer”, a fictitious player who sets prices with the value of excess demand 
as the objective function. (As a result, at any non-cooperative equilibrium of our 
social system, aggregate excess demand will be non-positive.) 
We take our set A of individuals to be finite and partitioned into I(O), I, J}, 
where 0 is our “auctioneer”, I is the set of consumers, and J is the set of firms. 
For our social system S = {(X,, Fat s *, S,),.,), we first describe the characteris- 
tics of the firms i E J. 
4 To keep the exposition simple, here we do not allow for the presence of assets or futures markets 
that give trading opportunities over time. These could be incorporated without much difficulty. For 
instance there could, on top of apples x and bananas y. be money z too, and in each period z could 
only be spent or saved for the next decision moment. A consumer i E I would then have initial 
endowments (%I, y(, .?I) in each period t = 1,2,. . ., where the money endowment ii = zi- ’ is the 
chosen level of non-negative saving in the previous period, the consumption decision at t being taken 
so as to maximize ui(xl, y!, zl) subject o p’xj + q’y,f + zi s p’Il + 4’7,’ + ii and ii = z:- ’ (t = 
1,2,...), p’ and q’ standing for the prices of x’ and y’. respectively. Thus, in this model, z is also 
num&aire, and there is no borrowing from the future. (It might be instructive to think of x (or y> as 
labor here.) 
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3.1. Firms (producers) 
Taking some c > 0 sufficiently large, for each firm j E J, we let 
Xj={_YEs21 IIYII SC}, 
be the behavior space of j. Agreeing to give the finite topology 5 to all 
hyperspaces of a Euclidean space, we take 
Fj={Y~ZQIXj]ltj~Y}, (1) 
as the feasibility space of the typical firm j E J. Thus, Fj covers Xi, and is 
convex. We also check that Fj is a closed subspace of ZIXjl, the (hype&pace 
of the non-empty compact subsets of Xj. To that end,first we note that G = {K E 
N Xi] IQ E K} is closed in x[ Xi] (for, taking U = Xi\ IO}, U c Xj is open, and 
{K E Z[ X.1 I K c U) = G’ is therefore open in the upper semifinite topology). 
Since Z&? t Xj] is closed by A.1, it follows that Fj = G n Z&‘[ Xj] is also closed 
in a Xi], satisfying (PS2). 
The preference d j of any firm is that represented by its profit function 
rrj : X X .F X Xj + 8, and rrj may be of various forms. One form is that of 
T~(x, F, Zj) =Xo*Zjt (2) 
the inner product of the price x,, (chosen by the auctioneer, 0) with the production 
plan zj of firm j. Alternatively, we can incorporate switching costs 6 in rrj by 
giving it a form: 
mj( X, F, Zj) = ~01 min{ xjl, Zj]) + X02 Zj2. (3) 
Here (xol, xo2) is the price vector chosen by the auctioneer. This reflects 
switching costs by penalizing period-to-period ecreases in absolute quantities of 
inputs and increases in quantities of outputs. In either form (2) or (31, rrj is readily 
verified to be a continuous function (so that d j is closed), and it can easily be 
checked to be quasi-concave in zj (so that 6 j is upper semiconvex on Xi>. Thus 
(PS3) is satisfied by $ r here. 
Regarding the feasibility maps: 
sj: XXF-+ [Fj], 
one can imagine four interesting possibilities. The first possibility is 
aj( x, F) = { P( Xj)Fj}, (4) 
s See footnote 3. 
6 Switching costs have often been recognized as an important factor affecting economic behavior. A 
most recent example (although in a different context) is in the work of Banks and Sundaram (1994): 
‘1 . ..Indeed. it is difficult to imagine a relevant economic decision problem in which the decision 
maker may costfessly move between alternatives” (Banks and Sundaram. 1994, p. 687). 
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where the function p determines a real number p( xi) E [O, 11 for each production 
plan xi of firm i E J. Thus, as a function of productive activity the production set 
is allowed to shrink but not allowed to swell. An example is where 
II xj II 
P(Xj) = 1 - 2c. 
This captures the idea of depreciation by use or a sort of depletion. AS a second 
possibility, the production plan of a firm may affect the productivity of the other 
fimrs. For instance, if the production of firm J’ E J is detrimental to the technol- 
ogy of firm j E J, we may see the effect of this through a feasibility map Sj of the 
form: 
sj( x, F, = { P( xj’)Fj), 
(5) 
where p: Xi, + [0, I] is as above. If, instead, pj is a function that typically takes 
values in excess of unity on Xi, and we write 
sj( x, F, = [( Pj( xj)Fj) “j)* 
This will reflect a certain type of learning by doing, which will preserve 
constant-returns-to-scale technologies. For a special learning-by-doing effect that 
favors small experiments in production, but regards large production as deple- 
tionary, one may regard the functional form: 
pj( xj) = II xj II “2e 
Assuming that p is continuous, Sj will be (upper semi-kontinuous in both forms 
(4) and (5), satisfying (PS4). 
As a next possibility, firm j E J can learn parts of the technology of firm 
j E J and combine these with its own know-how, to obtain its next period’s 
technology. 7 One such type of technology spill-over can be modeled by the 
feasibility map: 
2$(x, F) = {h(F,UF,& (6) 
where h : s??[ % *] -+ X[ ‘$I*] is the (closed) convex hull operator. Now factoriza- 
tion F c, IF,), E A is continuous, by Prakash and Sertel (1977), and the union 
operator is continuous on a 8 ‘1 X Z[ 8 * I. Since projection IF,}, E A * (F,, Fjl) 
is also continuous, Fj U Fj, is continuous in F, hence in (x, F). By Sertel (1989), 
furthermore, the closed convex hull operator h is continuous on 3?[ 8 m I. Thus, Sj 
in (6) is also (upper semi-kontinuous, again satisfying (PS4). 
’ The tim je / in (6) and (7) below can be seen as a bartender who always knows how to make 
cocktails (convex combinations) of recipes (productions) he (it) knows, in (6) discovering an entire new 
recipe list F,,, and in (7) discovering only some new recipe. xi. Once any recipes are “discovered”, 
their convex combinations with all known (previously discovered) recipes become known too. 
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The fourth possibility is that firm j sees the production activity xi, of firm /’ 
and, thus, “learns” all convex combinations of Xi with any xj E Fj. This sort of 
“learning from one’s neighbors” is expressed by the following form of feasibility 
map: 
Sj( X, F) = [ h( ( xj’} U Fj)) * (7) 
This feasibility map is also (upper semi-)continuous, as one can establish by 
arguments similar to those in the case of (61, once again obeying (PS4). 
Now we describe the characteristics of the consumers (i E I). 
3.2. Consumers 
A consumer i E I is specified by an ordered quadruplet: 
(xiY wiV ei? Ui)V 
where picking some d > 0 sufficiently large, we always take the “consumption 
set” to be 
X;= {z& I z< (d, d)}, 
while the “initial endowment” wi E Xi with wi B 0, and the “portfolio” Bi E 8: 
(with C, E ,t!Itj = 1 for each firm j E J) are as usual, and the “utility” is some 
ui : X x 9 x Xi -+ 8, where _8i for j E J is given by (I>, Yi for each consumer 
i E I is given by 
and S,, = {X,} with X, = ( xt, E 8: I x0, + xo2 = 1) will be the price simplex for 
the auctioneer. 
To express the idea of a budget set for consumer i E I, we write 
B(x,, x ,; q, ~9~) = xiEXiIx,*xiIx,.e++max , 
(8) 
where x,, is the auctioneer’s chosen price vector, x, E X, = nj, , Xj stands for 
the production plan profile of the producers. Now, clearly, 
STil{B(xo, XJ; Oi* Bi)Ix0E&, XJ~XJ}, 
while Fi satisfies (PS2), since it is closed in aXi] (see A.l), covers Xi and is 
convex. 
For the feasibility map Si : X X F + [Fi] we take 
Si( X, F) = {B( Xgt XJ; Wiy ei>}, 
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whose unique selection is the budget set map /3; : X X 9 -+ F;, with 
actually independent of F and x1 E X, = I-I k e , X,, depending only on (x0, x, >. 
From A.2 we see that pi is continuous (since the budget size b =x0 . wi + 
max{O, Cj, , fIijxO . xj} is continuous in (x,, w,, fli} and hence also aj is (upper 
semi-)continuous, thus satisfying (PS4). 
So far, our consumers are quite classical text-book types; what will distinguish 
them from the run of the mill will be their preferences. Each consumer i’s 
preference s i will be represented by the utility ui : X X 9 X Xi + 3, and it is in 
the specification of this utility that we capture certain possible paradigmatic 
characteristics that our consumers may exhibit. For this purpose, it will suffice to 
regard the general Cobb-Douglas-inspired form: 
ui( x, F, zi) = z;‘(~* F’z,!2- I‘,(~, F), 
where, pi : X X _Y + [O, 11 is a continuous function determining the elasticity of 
utility w.r.t. the consumption of the two goods, zi, and zi2. The continuity of pi 
ensures that of ui, so d i is always closed. The fact that p&x, F) E [0, 11 ensures 
that ui is concave in zi, so & i is certainly upper semiconvex on Xi. Thus (PS3) 
is satisfied by s i here. 
First, we consider the case of pi dependent only on x, in particular p&x, F) 
= r;(x), so that 
u;( x, F, q) = ,,!~(=)z,!~-~J(~), 
where ri is continuous. Specifically, setting 
ri( x, = x, “c’,. > 
11 12 
exemplifies a paradigm of addiction. The more the consumer i consumes of 
alcoholic beverages (xi,), the more partial he becomes toward them in his next 
consumption decision ( zi, >. Alternatively, setting 
ri(x)= x 
II 
x:x. 7 
12 
we obtain a “flip-jlop” boredom effect, whereby higher consumption of one good 
renders the consumer more easily bored by this good and tilts him to be more 
partial towards the other in his next consumption decision. 
Furthermore, writing 
li’( x, = x, xc’,, 7 
11 12 
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gives us an emulation effect, where consumer i’ becomes more partial towards 
wearing dark suits xi,, the more his boss i wears them (xi,). Likewise, writing 
ri’( X, = x, ‘J,, > 
11 12 
gives the opposite effect, which we may call negative mulation where consumer 
i’ becomes less partial towards wearing dark suits the more his boss’ butler i 
wears them. 
The peculiarities of consumer preferences displayed so far are in the genre of 
externalities that have certainly been discussed both, verbally (e.g. by Veblen, 
1899, in the case of emulation) and theoretically (e.g. by McKenzie, 1955; 8 
Shafer and Sonnenschein, 1975; von WeizGcker, 1971), and our indicating to 
such possibilities heralds no news. The next family of possibilities in preference 
externalities, however, may not be such old hat in general equilibrium existence 
theory. For now we take pi to be of the form pi(x, F) = s,(F,), dependent on the 
feasibility Fj (alone), where the function si: F + [0, 11 is continuous. Thus, we 
are now looking at the case where 
ui( x, F, q) = Z,!~(F~)Z;2-S~(Fr), 
in order to model a certain freedom effect. ’ Consider, first, the specific form 
si( Fi) = &SUP{ II Z II I Z E Fi}, 
where si measures the sup norm of the consumer’s own feasibility Fi. In this case, 
the greater the consumer’s freedom in choosing z with a large norm, the less his 
partiality for happiness pills ( zi2>. lo Alternatively, we can take either of 
Si(Fi) = $SUp{Z,Z2 I ZE Fi), 
si(F,)=~max(SUp{Z, I ZEF;), SUp{.z21 ZEFi}}, (11) 
8 
The entry on “externalities” by Laffont (1987) in the New Palgraue: A Dictionary of Economics 
mentions only McKenzie (1955) regarding equilibrium existence results in the presence of externalities. 
9 One should be cautious not to regard this as a Slutsky-like income (or wealth) effect, as the 
examples below should clearly show. 
“The reader may find it entertaining to observe and tabulate (as below) demand on budget sets 
B = h({(O, O), (4 0). (0, &I), B’ = h(((O, 0). (d/Z, 01, (0, d))), +B = h(I(O, 0,). (d/2, O),(O, d/2))), 
B, = h(((O, 0). (d/2,0), (0, d/n))), B, = h(((O. O), (d/2,0), (O,O))). 
Budget set B B’ fB B” B, 
Demand 1 (40) ($) (i, G) (;, ;) B, 
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Si( Fi) = +tnin{sup( z, I 2 E F;}, SUP{22 I Z E F;:}}, (12) 
~~(~j)~~SU~(I~IZE~~}SU~{Z*IIE~~}~ (13) 
as a measure of the consumer’s freedom of choice, I’ his partiality for jolly pills 
( zi2) decreasing with freedom. Likewise, we could let pi( x, 8’) depend instead on 
other consumers’ feasibilities, for instance by setting in each above case pi( x, F) 
= si(F:) for some i’ E I\ {i}. The cases (9) to (13) above would then have their 
analogous forms (9’) to (13’) with Fi replaced by Fis. 
Of course, various combinations and derivatives of these forms - and certainly 
yet other forms - can be imagined for the functions pi. As remarked at the outset 
of specifying the Cobb-Douglas-like form with elasticities pi and 1 - pi, all of 
the above considered forms of externality in preference are admissible from the 
viewpoint of satisfying the PS sufficient conditions for the existence of equilib- 
rium, since preference s i in each case is closed and on Xi upper semiconvex. 
3.3. The auctioneer 
Finally, regarding our auctioneer 0 E A, we specify: 
X0=(@%: IP,+P,=l}, 
90= {X*1+ 
with 6,: X X F + [To] taken as the constant function with value: 
6,(x, F) = (X,,). 
The auctioneer’s preference is that represented by u,,: X X 9 X X, +B, defined 
through 
u,,( x, F, zo) = zo . (CCxiewi) - E'j)' 
isl JEJ 
Thus, our auctioneer is quite classical, S,, clearly obeying (PS2), d 0 obeying 
(PS3), and S, trivially satisfying (PS4). 
4. Non-cooperative equilibria as sustainable Walrasian equilibria 
We have run through a broad class of examples allowing for several sorts of 
endogeneity in technologies and various kinds of technological externality. Then, 
” Another possible case one might consider for si(FJ is also the normalized Lebesque measure of F, 
(i.e. the measure divided by d*). Cf. Kreps (1979), Barbed and Pattanaik (1984). Barbed et al. (19841, 
Pattanaik and XII (1990). 
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again, we have considered over a dozen types of endogeneity in preferences or of 
preferential externalities. In each case we have checked that the sufficient condi- 
tions PSl-PS4 of Prakash and Sertel for the existence of a non-cooperative 
equilibrium are satisfied. This means that we could take several different types of 
producer, each subject o one or another of our various technological externalities 
or switching costs, and we could mix this motley bunch with a yet motlier bunch 
of consumers, each exhibiting one or another of the various preferential extemali- 
ties we have discussed, and we would still be guaranteed the existence of 
non-cooperative quilibria for the social system they comprise. These equilibria 
would furthermore be genuinely economic equilibria and, at least in the absence of 
switching costs, Walrusian in the usual sense of satisfying material balances and 
individual optimization - in the form of profit maximization, subject o production 
sets for producers and utility maximization subject to the budget constraints of 
consumers - as well as susruinuble in the sense that the endogenous feasibilities 
are also at rest. 
To be more specific, in the absence of switching costs (e.g. when all the firms 
have profit functions of form (211, we can show by standard arguments that at any 
non-cooperative equilibrium (x * , F * >, the material balances condition: 
icl jGJ 
holds. To that end, first we observe that xi . xf 2 0 has to hold for each j E J 
since 0 E Fj* . Hence, the feasibility (budget, see (8)) requirement on a consumer’s 
choice can be re-expressed as 
jCJ 
for each i E I. Adding this inequality over consumers, we obtain: 
x; * (~(x~-oi)-~x;)_<o. 
iCl jEJ 
(16) 
which shows that the maximum “utility” of the auctioneer is non-positive. Now, 
suppose that in some commodity, the aggregate xcess demand were positive, 
permitting the auctioneer higher utility u,, than that at the fixed point (by adjusting 
prices suitably). This would contradict that U&X * , F * , . ) is maximized on X, at 
xl, and so we conclude that aggregate xcess demand in each commodity is 
non-positive. 
In the presence of switching costs (i.e. when some firms have profit functions 
of form (311, however, a non-cooperative quilibrium need not satisfy material 
balances. To see where the standard argument fails, imagine the possibility of a 
non-cooperative quilibrium where x;i = - 1, x;~ = 0, and xl, = 1. Now at 
equilibrium zf = xf and profit rj* = x0; z,> + x& z;~ < 0, but the consumers’ 
limited liability (see (8)) prevents this loss from being reflected in the typical 
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consumer’s budget, so consumer i behaves as if the loss of i is not his liability 
even if he fully owns firm Aeji = 1) and owns no other stock (ei, = 0 for every 
k E J\(j)). But then (15) does not follow from (8). Therefore, with switching 
costs of the type we have supposed (31, we cannot guarantee that non-cooperative 
equilibria will also be sustainable Walrasian. 
5. Closing remarks 
To be reader-friendly, and as simple as possible in our exposition, we have kept 
our examples in the realm of a strip-miner, i.e. we have only scratched the surface 
of the rich domain of imaginable cases covered by the PS sufficient conditions for 
the existence of equilibrium, and economists will easily find more examples 
relevant o their special interests. Where the applications of the PS equilibrium 
existence theorem may be especially fruitful is in the general area of public 
economics, abundant in externalities. In particular, environmental economists are 
welcome to apply the theorem in their domain of discourse, just as researchers in 
adjustment costs, in sustainable growth, in endogenous growth may find it 
attractive to take advantage of the variety of externalities allowed by the theorem. 
Finally, the facility of dealing with hyperspaces in the PS model may be 
attractive to researchers in extending preferences to hyperspaces, as in the 
literature on the ranking of opportunity sets (e.g. Kreps, 1979; Barberi and 
Pattanaik, 1984; Barber6 et al., 1984; Pattanaik and Xu, 1990). It will have been 
noted that individuals’ preferences in the PS social systems already comprise such 
extensions as their restrictions to appropriate subspaces. 
Appendix 
A.I. Theorem: Let X Z fl be a locally compact space lying in a real Hausdor- 
topological uector space L. Then .%3’[ X] Cm X ] is closed, under the finite 
topology on Z[ X I. 
Proof. Defining 2’ = Z[ Xl\2?&‘[Xl, take any H E Z. We construct an open 
nbd 2Y with H E Z! c 2’. To this end, observe that, since H is non-convex, there 
are points x, x’ E H and A E [O, 11 such that X = An + (1 - A)x’ E H. As convex 
combination with coefficients (A, 1 - A) (i.e. the function A : L X L + L defined 
through A( y, y’) = A y + (1 - A) y’> is continuous, taking any open nbd V C X\ H 
of X, there are open nbds U and U’ of x and x’, resp., such that Ay + (1 - A)y’ 
E V whenever y E U and y’ E U’ (i.e. A(U X U’> C VI. As L (hence X CL) is 
Hausdorff and X is locally compact, w.l.o.g., V may be assumed compact. Thus, 
V’=X\V is an open nbd of H. Now writing %= (cl>_17 (U’>-f~ (V’),, 
where (U)-=(KE~X]IK~U+#}, (U’)-={KE~X]IK~IU’#@) and 
16 E. Bagel, M.R. Serrel/ Journal of Mathematical Economics 25 (1996) l-18 
(Vc>+={KEtiX]] KC V”), we have HE V/C, while (U>_ and (V’>_ 
are sub-basic open sets in the lower semifinite topology and (V’>+ is a basic 
open set in the upper semifinite topology on 3?[ X 1, so Y is open in the finite 
topology (i.e. the coarsest opology containing both the upper and the lower 
semifinite topologies) on ZjX]. Thus, 3 is open, i.e. S_?&‘[X] is closed in 
Z[X], as to bc shown. 
A.2. Continuity of budget correspondences. Proving the continuity of the “budget 
correspondences” B,:(p, b)HBi(p, b)=(xiEXiI p.xi<b} on X,X(0,03), 
where X, is the price simplex (here in ‘8 :I, is by now a standard exercise for 
economists. I2 Nevertheless, we would like to give a direct proof. 
Using A.1.5 of PS, we first establish the upper semicontinuity of Bi by 
showing that the graph G(B,) = {(p, b, x) E X, X (0, m> X Xi I p * xi I b} of Bi 
is closed. For this, simply note that the “deficit” u( p, b, xi) = p. xi - b is 
continuous and that G(B,) = u-‘((-co, 01) is, therefore, closed. 
To establish the lower semicontinuity of Bi, we take any open V c Xi and show 
that the inverse image B,: ‘(( V > _ ) of the (sub-basic) open set (V > _ (of the 1.s.f. 
topology) is open. To that end, take any (p, $1 E B;‘(( V ) _ ). Thus, Bi( p, %) n 
V # 0 and, since b > 0, there exists X E V such that ij . E -b < 0. Since the 
deficit function u is continuous, there exists a nbd U of (5, b) such that for all 
(p, b)EU, u(UX{E})c(-m,O), so that ZEB~(~, b) 
(V > - . Thus, B,: ‘((V > _ ) is open, completing our proof. 
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